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[W]ith the record of corporate executive wrongdoing at 
dramatic levels, the government is concerned about giving 
corporate executives more leeway and making litigation 
against them more difficult.  With Wall Street bonuses in the 
$40 billion range, Mr. Paulson is worried that Wall Streeters 
are not treated well enough.  With executives’ pay in the 
stratosphere, not even counting what they steal in options, the 
government is worried that things are too tough for them. 
New York Times columnist Ben Stein commenting on efforts by 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson Jr. to relieve the 
supposed litigation and regulatory burdens on American 
business.1 
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1 Ben Stein, Op-Ed., The Split-Screen State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2007, § 3, at 8. 
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n The Path of the Law, his famous address at the turn of the 
last century, Holmes eloquently stated that the purpose of a 
legal system is to hold people accountable for their actions.2  
One of its chief concerns, then, should be the conduct of 
corporate officials because they are entrusted with the lion’s 
share of our country’s economic resources.3  Yet that is one 
place where law has not lived up to its high calling. 
This lax oversight is most apparent in the business judgment 
rule, a major principle of corporate law.  The business judgment 
rule has been cleverly called “the rule that isn’t a rule”4 and “the 
world’s most expensive raincoat.”5  It is typically invoked as a 
defense to charges that business officials have failed to use due 
care in running their companies. 
The business judgment rule assumes that courts are ill suited 
to engage in after-the-fact review of actions by corporate officers 
and directors.6  Its application therefore usually results in the 
exoneration of those officials from charges that they have failed 
to act responsibly in their offices.  As a classic judicial statement 
of the rule puts it, corporate executives and directors can only be 
held liable for “gross negligence” in running their firms.7  
 
2 If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for 
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience. 
O.W. Holmes, Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Address at 
the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 
1897), in The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
3 Approximately forty-two percent of U.S. adults, eighty-four million individuals, 
own stock, many indirectly through institutions such as mutual funds and pension 
plans.  Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics, 31 J. CORP. L. 591, 
594 n.2 (2006). 
4 Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule–The Business Judgment Rule, 
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002). 
5 Jonathan Macey, Delaware:  Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2005). 
6 It has therefore been called an abstention doctrine.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 83 
(2004). 
7 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).  See infra note 189 and 
accompanying text. 
I 
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Legislation has weakened that undemanding standard even 
further.8 
But “[f]erment is abroad in the law.”9  Since the collapse of 
the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s,10 one episode of corporate 
malfeasance after another has come to light.11  The most brazen 
and pervasive is the ongoing options backdating scandal 
involving executives of over one hundred known companies, 
many from the prominent high-tech industry.  A large number of 
executives secretly profited from this blatantly fraudulent 
practice, and scores of boards appear to have turned a blind eye 
to it.12 
This Article will begin by describing how options backdating 
works, placing it in the context of earlier and still ongoing 
deceitful corporate operations.13  It will then briefly detail 
various governmental investigations and prosecutions of this 
corrupt conduct.14  But public resources can only reach a fraction 
of such illegal behavior.  This Article will therefore use the 
options backdating scandal to spotlight the derivative suit, an 
important tool that shareholders can employ on their own to 
secure redress in these cases as well as in addressing other frauds 
by corporate insiders. 
As it is currently understood, the business judgment rule 
presents a high hurdle to the maintenance of those vital 
actions.15  Fortunately, recent decisions from Delaware involving 
 
8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).  See infra notes 192–96 and 
accompanying text. 
9 Used with homage to the great jurist Karl Llewellyn.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Some Realism About Realism–Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1222, 1222 (1931). 
10 As one commentator described that high-flying era: 
 The technology and telecommunications boom made fools of all of us.  
From the corporate executives who promised results that in hindsight seem 
absurd to the ordinary day traders . . ., all were overcome with a complex 
mixture of credulity, jealousy, vanity and greed . . . . In between were the 
enablers–the regulators, bankers, analysts, consultants, accountants, 
lawyers, credit agencies and journalists who could have done something to 
stop the madness, but did nothing until way too late. 
Jonathan A. Knee, House of Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 7, at 14. 
11 See infra notes 17–33 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 48–64 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 17–27 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 101–08 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
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options backdating indicate that courts may no longer 
automatically accept that defense as a device to thwart 
meritorious derivative actions.16  This Article will close by 
encouraging derivative suits as a way to promote a more robust 
judicial review of improper corporate conduct. 
I 
OPTIONS BACKDATING:  THE LATEST IN A RUN OF EGREGIOUS 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
A.  A String of Scandals 
1.  Enron and Its Fellow Travelers 
Since the bursting of the high-tech bubble of the late 1990s, 
our country has been plagued by an excess of improper and 
fraudulent business activity.  Much of the froth in that 
overpriced market was due to deregulation of two industries, 
telecommunications and finance.  Speculative excesses there 
followed weak government oversight.17 
Then came Enron and its companion cases in the early years 
of this decade, where over two dozen large publicly held 
companies admitted to inflating their revenues through 
improper accounting practices.18  Opulent lifestyles19 and corrupt 
auditing20 went hand in hand with executive greed.  Such 
revelations precipitated the far-reaching Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
16 See infra notes 225–37 and accompanying text. 
17 See John Cassidy, Goodbye to All That:  Who Killed the Boom?  Two 
Economists Make Their Cases, NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2003, at 92, 94. 
18 Two good books about those scandals are BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER 
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:  THE AMAZING RISE AND 
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) and REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. 
EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS:  HOW TWO WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS 
UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA 
(2003). 
19 For the notorious case of Dennis Kozlowski, CEO of Tyco, see Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Tyco’s Ex-Chief Going to Court in “Greed Case,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2003, at A1. 
20 Arthur Andersen, a major accounting firm, was convicted of obstructing 
justice.  See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 1, at 1. 
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legislation designed to shore up the integrity of corporate 
financial statements.21 
As such wrongdoings came to light, it became apparent that 
they were condoned by inattentive directors.22  Such lax practices 
were epitomized by the admission of directors of the New York 
Stock Exchange that they had only a vague understanding of 
how the lush compensation package they had handed their 
chairman, Richard Grasso, might compromise the man charged 
with policing their industry’s trading practices.23 
Accompanying such corporate malfeasance was deceitful 
conduct by market analysts who distorted their research reports 
and stock ratings so their firms could curry favor with business 
clients.24  Trackers of high-flying Internet stocks at leading 
companies publicly touted their shares at the same time they 
were calling them “junk” and other epithets in their personal 
emails.25 
Next came disclosures about fraudulent practices by mutual 
fund managers such as late trading and abusive market timing.  
 
21 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  Among other 
things, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation created an accounting oversight board for 
public companies, promulgated stricter standards for auditor independence, 
enhanced financial disclosure requirements, and stiffened penalties for white collar 
crime.  For a good summary of that legislation and its impact on corporate America, 
see Joris M. Hogan, The Enron Legacy:  Corporate Governance for a New Era, 31 
SEC. REG. L.J. 142 (2003). 
 Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson Jr. led the movement to relax the 
accounting requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, which brought the stinging comment 
that introduces this Article.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
22 See Corporate Boards:  The Way We Govern Now, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, 
at 59, 59 (asserting that “[t]oo many boards are stuffed with yes men who question 
little that their chief executives suggest”). 
23 See Kurt Eichenwald, In String of Corporate Troubles, Critics Focus on Boards’ 
Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, § 1, at 1; Gretchen Morgenson, As Scandals 
Still Flare, Small Victories for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, § 3, at 1. 
24 See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Andrew M. Cuomo, 
Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the “Global Resolution” of 
Wall Street Investigations (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 
statements/global_resolution.html. 
25 Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business 
Law Section 354 at 12, 34–35, In re Merril Lynch and Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Nos. 02 MDL 1484 MP, 02 CV 3210 MP, 02 CV 3321 MP), 
available at www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (statement of Eric R. 
Dinallo, Chief of the Investment Protection Bureau of the New York State 
Department of Law); see also Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (noting that one 
such analyst, Henry Blodget, “continued to recommend companies that he 
internally described as a ‘piece of crap,’ ‘piece of junk,’ or ‘piece of [expletive]’”). 
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Those executives manipulated their buying and selling practices 
to benefit themselves at the expense of their investors.26  They 
also made various sweetheart arrangements with brokers to 
recommend their offerings.27 
2.  Excessive Corporate Compensation and Income Inequality 
Public concern began to focus on soaring executive pay28 and 
exorbitant bonuses29 that exacerbated an already bad situation of 
income inequality.30  The average CEO of a sizeable corporation 
now makes $10 million per year–almost 400 times the amount 
paid to an average worker, compared to only twenty times in the 
1960s.31 
 
26 See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio 
Holdings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8343, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,287, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2937, at *5 (Dec. 11, 2007).  This illegal mutual fund 
activity resulted in $4.3 billion in penalties.  Paul H. Dawes & Kory Sorrell, Tools 
for the Imperfect Instrument:  Practical Advice for Investigating Stock Options 
Awards, 1157 PLI/CORP 641, 643 (2006). 
27 For example, as part of these investigations the SEC fined Lawrence J. Lasser, 
the former CEO of Putnam Investments, $75,000 for using his mutual fund 
shareholders’ money to pay brokerage houses to push Putnam shares.  Jennifer 
Levitz, Former Putnam CEO Is Fined by the SEC, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007, at 
C13. 
28 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Peer Pressure:  Inflating Executive Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
29 See, e.g., Bert Caldwell, SEC Tugs on Reins of Runaway Bonuses, 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 24, 2006, at E1 (discussing how 
Goldman Sachs’s chief executive officer earned a bonus of $53.4 million in 2006 and 
the CEO at Morgan Stanley received $40 million in bonus compensation). 
30 Our global economy may be lifting some workers worldwide out of poverty, 
but here the very rich are seizing almost all of the wealth that it generates.  As one 
astute observer put it:  “Meanwhile everyone else–not just blue-collar factory 
workers but also the wide office-working middle class–shuffles along, grimly 
waiting for the next round of cost-cuts.”  Rich Man, Poor Man, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
20, 2007, at 15, 15. 
 Globalization may not even be delivering on its promise to raise the standards of 
living of most people in poor countries.  A fine investigative piece by the Wall Street 
Journal stated:  “As trade, foreign investment and technology have spread, the gap 
between economic haves and have-nots has frequently widened, not only in wealthy 
countries like the U.S. but in poorer ones like Mexico . . . .”  Bob Davis et al., 
Globalization’s Gains Come with a Price, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2007, at A1.  For 
another biting piece on income inequality in America, see Ben Stein, Of Tax Cuts 
and Those $10 Million Bat Mitzvahs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, § 3, at 1. 
31 Jim Webb, Opinion, American Workers Have a Chance to Be Heard, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 15, 2006, at A18. 
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In 2005 the pay of some CEOs topped $100 million,32 and 
many times this lavish compensation seemed to have no 
connection to the performances of those executives.  For 
instance, one study showed that in a number of large companies 
that did poorly and lost value for their shareholders, CEO pay 
averaged $16.7 million and took 6.4% of total earnings.33 
3.  Problems with Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and Subprime 
Lending 
The recent rise to economic dominance of two specific types 
of organizational investors, private equity firms and hedge funds, 
has also caused various concerns about harm to shareholders 
and the public interest.34  Private equity is a more genteel name 
for groups that were called corporate raiders in the 1980s.  Their 
goal is to buy up businesses from stockholders so that they can 
restructure and resell them in different forms.35 
Increasingly, commentators complain that executives of the 
acquired firms profit at the expense of their shareholders.  The 
Vice Chancellor of Delaware recently gave credence to those 
concerns by finding that, in two such transactions, the board of 
 
32 Gary Strauss & Barbara Hansen, Companies Think They’re Worth . . . ; Median 
Pay for CEOs of 100 Largest Companies Rose 25%, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2006, at 
B1.  By contrast, the most highly compensated major league baseball player, Alex 
Rodriguez, receives $27.7 million per year.  Associated Press, A-Rod, Giambi and 
Jeter Top Off Highest Paid List, ESPN.COM, Apr. 2, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
mlb/news/story?id=2822968. 
33 Gretchen Morgenson, The Best and the Worst in Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
 For an excellent academic study of how executive compensation is virtually 
unregulated in corporate law, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).  The SEC has adopted new rulings requiring 
public companies to make fuller disclosures of the total compensation packages that 
officers and directors receive.  SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure 
Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters, SEC 
Press Release No. 2006-123 (July 26, 2006).  Some shareholders are rebelling on this 
issue, and have submitted proposals for an advisory vote on executive pay at 
roughly sixty annual meetings.  Erin White & Aaron O. Patrick, Shareholders Push 
for Vote on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at B1. 
34 According to one source, this constitutes an “unprecedented wave of deal 
making.”  Dennis K. Berman et al., As Deal Barriers Fall, Takeover Bids Multiply, 
WALL ST. J., May 8, 2007, at A1. 
35 As to the questionable impact that these have on communities and the 
economy in general, see Daniel J. Morrissey, Safeguarding the Public Interest in 
Leveraged Buyouts, 69 OR. L. REV. 47, 73–82 (1990). 
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directors had not made adequate disclosures to shareholders 
about the incentives paid to management.36 
Hedge funds gather capital from well-heeled institutions and 
individuals for speculative investments.  They now account for 
more than half the trading on the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges37 and control more than $2 trillion worth of assets.38  
Investing in them is costly since the funds charge their clients 
hefty percentages of the profits they make.  Managers of three 
funds earned more that $1 billion in 2006.39 
Worries about the deleterious impact that investing 
organizations can have on the overall economy first surfaced in 
1998 with the Long Term Capital Growth fiasco.  Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and others had to intervene 
to make sure the collapse of that fund would not imperil our 
entire financial system.40  That unfortunate history may be 
repeating itself today as concern grows about the exceedingly 
leveraged and speculative investments hedge funds are making.41 
 
36 Peter Lattman & Dana Cimilluca, Court Faults Buyouts, WALL ST. J., July 12, 
2007, at C1. 
37 Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2006, at A1.  As one recent commentator on the market put it: 
[B]illions of dollars are flowing into hedge funds, unregulated investment 
funds for the very wealthy that are shaking up the market with aggressive 
trading strategies. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Many use debt as part of their investment strategy, sell stocks short, 
buy complex derivative securities, or trade using complicated and 
proprietary mathematical formulas. 
KAREN BLUMENTHAL, GRANDE EXPECTATIONS:  A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF 
STARBUCKS’ STOCK 3, 109 (2007). 
38 David Cho, Hedge Funds Mystify Markets, Regulators, WASH. POST, July 4, 
2007, at A1. 
39 John Cassidy, Hedge Clipping, NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2007, at 28, 28.  These 
earnings are only taxed at the capital gains rate of fifteen percent instead of at the 
ordinary income rate of thirty-five percent.  Many feel this is a misuse of tax 
categories, and there is a movement to rectify it.  See David Cay Johnston, Tax 
Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A1; Paul 
Krugman, Op-Ed., An Unjustified Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A19. 
40 For a good description of the Long Term Capital Growth collapse, see Michael 
Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 24, 1999, at 25. 
41 See Henny Sender, Hedge Funds’ Risky Bets Come to Roost, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
8, 2007, at C1; Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, As Funds Leverage Up, Fears of 
Reckoning Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at A1. 
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Hedge funds buy and sell all kinds of financial instruments, 
including mortgage backed securities42 that have suffered 
devaluations because of increased defaults in the subprime 
mortgage lending market.43  In June, the investment firm Bear 
Stearns offered $3.2 billion in loans to bail out two of its hedge 
funds that had speculated heavily in such collateralized debt 
obligations.44 
As such aggregations of capital have proliferated both in 
number and resources, investment firms have enjoyed a 
corresponding access to the privileged information that power 
brings.  As such, it appears that their above average returns may 
owe more to the misuse of inside information than to investing 
acumen.45 
The accounting and analyst scandals of the late 1990s may also 
be repeating themselves in the crash of companies that 
specialized in subprime mortgage lending, which, as noted 
above, is tied to the risks of hedge fund investing.  When housing 
prices were rising, those firms made mortgages to cash-strapped 
home buyers with money from institutional investors.46  But 
when the housing market recently took a downward turn, the 
value placed on mortgage backed securities appears not to have 
 
42 See Anderson, supra note 37. 
43 See Scott Patterson, Subprime Flu Sheds a Light on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., 
July 2, 2007, at C1; see also infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
44 Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund with Big Loan, WALL 
ST. J., June 23, 2007, at A1.  For a good discussion of how securities that were 
backed by subprime mortgages were given inflated credit ratings and then sold to 
hedge funds like Bear Stearns, see Floyd Norris, Market Shock:  AAA Rating May 
Be Junk, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at C1. 
45 See Anderson, supra note 37.  The SEC recently announced a $16 million 
settlement against a financial services firm, Zurich Capital Markets Inc., that had 
aided and abetted four hedge funds in carrying out schemes to defraud mutual 
funds by illegal market timing.  Settled Administrative Proceeding Against Zurich 
Capital Markets Inc. for Financing of Hedge Funds’ Illegal Market Timing, SEC 
Press Release No. 2007-88 (May 7, 2007).  Concerns have also been raised that an 
SEC investigation of insider trading at a prominent hedge fund may have been 
compromised by the use of political influence.  See Walt Bogdanich & Gretchen 
Morgenson, S.E.C. Inquiry on Hedge Fund Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2006, § 1, at 1. 
46 See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Suit Says Neighborhood’s Boom Was 
Built on Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at C1. 
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been adjusted to reflect the diminished worth of the underlying 
properties.47 
B.  Options Backdating Front and Center 
1.  The Rise of Stock Options as Executive Compensation 
Against the backdrop of all this troublesome business activity 
has come disclosure of perhaps the most egregious and pervasive 
fraudulent conduct by corporate officials in recent memory–
options backdating.  This particularly pernicious form of 
corporate kleptomania had its genesis in reformist sentiments 
two decades ago that sought to align the pay of corporate 
executives more directly with the interests of their 
shareholders.48 
As part of those efforts, companies granted options to their 
officials giving them the right to purchase the company’s stock at 
some time in the future for its current price, i.e., “at the 
money.”49  The officers of those firms, it was assumed, would 
then have an incentive to increase the worth of their shares so 
that they could profit by exercising their options to purchase 
stock that had risen in value.  Cash-poor start-up companies also 
began using options packages liberally to attract and compensate 
key employees.50  Much of this occurred in Silicon Valley high-
 
47 See Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2007, § 1, at l. 
48 See Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Bosses’ Pay:  How Stock Options 
Became Part of the Problem, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at A1; see also Paul 
Krugman, Op-Ed., Incentives for the Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at A23.  
Stock options also gained favor after a 1993 tax law limited the deductibility of 
executive compensation by corporate taxpayers but exempted options as 
performance based compensation.  See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). 
 Proposals that would make stock options deductible from corporate profits were 
defeated in 1994.  Thus, as one commentator put it, “[W]hat wasn’t there to like 
about a stock option? . . . You could grant them in unlimited amounts with no 
expense, and claim a tax deduction.”  Maremont & Forelle, supra (quoting 
compensation expert Paula Todd). 
 In 2004 and 2006, all that finally changed when accounting and tax principles 
were modified to respectively require that options be shown as expenses on a 
company’s income statements and to reflect their imputed costs as well.  Pearl 
Meyer et al., Option Pricing Abuse, 1562 PLI/CORP 285, 287 (2006). 
49 Maremont & Forelle, supra note 48. 
50 Id. 
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tech companies, where many investigations for wrongdoing are 
now focused.51 
Sometimes stock purchase rights provided legitimate 
incentives to executives, but many times they were just piled on 
top of already lush compensation packages.52  And in the bull 
market of the late 1990s, the rising tide richly rewarded all 
executives who held options regardless of their efforts.53  Those 
excesses were exacerbated when such grants were reloaded 
(given again to replace old ones that were exercised) or repriced 
(reissued at lower exercise charges when the market fell after 
their original award).54 
On top of this, those generous options packages committed 
companies to selling large numbers of their shares at prices 
below what they could get for them later in the open market, 
thus diluting the value of their existing shares.  And as the 
practice grew, this devaluation became even more pronounced 
until shares sold to optionees accounted for a sizeable 
percentage of the equity of large companies.55  As far back as 
1998 one renowned shareholder, the savvy and successful 
Warren Buffet, questioned executive options as “wildly 
capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as 
motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholders.”56 
2.  The Practice of Backdating 
When the stock market plummeted in the early part of this 
decade, many of those options grants were put “underwater,” 
i.e., the stock’s market price fell below the exercise price of the 
 
51 See Richard Marmaro & Ryan Weinstein, Opinion, Should Steve Jobs Go to 
Jail?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007, at A17. 
52 Maremont & Forelle, supra note 48. 
53 See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
18–19, 2006, at A1.  As one commentator put it, “The public was told that gigantic 
executive paychecks were rewards for exceptional performance, but in practice 
executives were lavishly paid simply for showing up at the office.”  Krugman, supra 
note 48. 
54 Maremont & Forelle, supra note 48. 
55 From the early 1990s to 2003, major corporations increased the average 
number of shares set aside for equity grants for employee incentives from eight 
percent to over seventeen percent of shares outstanding.  Meyer et al., supra note 
48, at 287. 
56 Dawes & Sorrell, supra note 26, at 643–44. 
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options.57  A host of companies then repriced those rights 
downward.58  It was then just a short step for greedy executives 
to cross the line into patently illegal conduct by simply 
backdating their options.59  They did so by selecting a time 
before the options were issued when the underlying shares were 
trading for a much lower price, and clandestinely changed the 
grant days to make it appear that the purchase rights were 
awarded at the earlier time.60  With a lower strike price, the 
executives could thus fraudulently increase their gains when they 
exercised those options.61  It was like betting on a winning horse 
after the race had been run.62 
 
57 Maremont & Forelle, supra note 48. 
58 Id.  As the author astutely points out, however, this practice of repricing had 
been going on for some time at many companies.  See id.  About eleven percent of 
companies repriced options at least once between 1992 and 1997.  Id.  Many did so a 
number of times as their stocks kept plunging. 
59 An example of how this occurred at a prominent company that was notorious 
in this backdating scandal is the case of Mercury Interactive, a high-tech software 
firm.  When the options issued to one of its star salesmen went underwater, the 
board of directors got the members of the company’s compensation committee to 
backdate those awards.  Eric Dash, Who Signed Off on Those Options?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
 Investing honestly in stocks, of course, is a notoriously risky business.  Much 
advice is available on that difficult process.  One well-written recent book about the 
market’s mysteries is Karen Blumenthal’s Grande Expectations, supra note 37, 
which tracks the movements of Starbucks’s stock during one calendar year. 
60 See Adam Lashinsky, Options Gone Wild!, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 86, 86; 
Maremont & Forelle, supra note 48.  The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation appears to 
have put an end to this practice by requiring notice of the granting of options two 
days after it occurs.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  
Previous rules were much laxer. 
61 As Professor Eric Lie put it in his 2005 study revealing these patterns of illegal 
conduct, “Unless executives have a superior ability to forecast the future short-term 
marketwide movements that drive the predicted stock returns, the results indicate 
that at least some of the official grant dates must have been set retroactively.”  Eric 
Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803 (2005). 
62 In refusing to dismiss a shareholder suit against UnitedHealth Group, Inc. for 
options backdating, U.S. District Judge James Rosenbaum wrote: 
Plaintiffs’ theory lies at the core of the plot in one of Hollywood’s most 
entertaining and honored films.  In The Sting, the bad guy is ultimately 
brought down by utterly charming con men, played by Paul Newman and 
Robert Redford.  They gain their revenge through a scheme involving 
“past-posting,” or betting on horse races after the results are known. 
David Phelps, A Little Hollywood Logic Keeps UnitedHealth Lawsuit in Court, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 5, 2007, at 2D.  For a further discussion 
of options backing at UnitedHealth Group, see infra notes 84–91 and accompanying 
text. 
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Others seemed to have found even more ingenious ways to 
game the system by forward-dating the grant dates to take 
advantage of market swings or keeping them open so they could 
pick the lowest point in a stock’s history to buy it.63  And it 
appears that some of those executives were also engaging in tax 
fraud by reporting their purchases at a time when the stock price 
was lower than when they actually bought it.  In that way, they 
could hide some of their gains.64 
3.  Outing the Fraud 
For some time, analysts and shareholder activists were aware 
of suspiciously fortuitous timing in the awarding of options.65  
But they shrugged it off as another form of insider trading, 
ascribing it to questionable practices known as “spring-loading” 
and “bullet-dodging.”66  In the former, options are awarded 
before the release of good news that sends the stock price 
higher.  In the latter, companies issue options right after the 
release of bad news, making their exercise price correspondingly 
lower.  Either way, the executives conveniently benefit from 
favorable changes in the stock’s price.67 
In 2005, however, an unprepossessing professor of finance at 
the University of Iowa, Erik Lie, published a study of almost six 
thousand options granted to corporate executives from 1992 to 
2002.68  Many times he found big jumps in stock prices right after 
options were said to have been granted even though there was 
no obviously favorable news that would account for such rises.69 
 
63 Adam Lashinsky, Why Options Backdating Is a Big Deal, FORTUNE, July 26, 
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/26/magazines/fortune/lashinsky.fortune/index 
.htm. 
64 See Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes Is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C1. 
65 See Steve Stecklow, Options Study Becomes Required Reading, WALL ST. J., 
May 30, 2006, at B1; see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., AN 
INVESTOR GUIDE TO THE STOCK OPTION TIMING SCANDAL 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/OptionTiming.pdf (discussing several academic studies 
published before 2005 that described that phenomenon). 
66 See Frank Bruni, A Buzz Saw of Buzzwords, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, § 4, at 
1. 
67 See Floyd Norris, They Deceived Shareholders.  Who Cares?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
6, 2006, at C1. 
68 Lie, supra note 61, at 802. 
69 Stecklow, supra note 65. 
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The Wall Street Journal followed with a study of its own on 
options awarded to select executives, finding that many times the 
underlying stock rose precipitously right after the purported 
grant dates of those rights–again without any concomitant news 
that would ostensibly trigger that jump.70  The obvious 
conclusion was that the dates when those options were 
purportedly granted had not resulted from a random walk.  
Rather, they had been cherry-picked to engineer the largest 
possible gain when exercised.  Professor Lie estimated that this 
occurred in 29.2% of listed companies.71 
The latest revelations on this matter are even more startling.  
The post–September 11, 2001, period was apparently prime time 
for such fraudulent activity.  With the market having its worst 
week in over sixty years, dozens of companies reported option 
grants to their executives or other employees.  But now a 
number of them have disclosed that those awards were made 
weeks later and backdated to that time.72 
4.  Can It Be Legal? 
Theoretically, these transactions, though unseemly, could be 
legal.73  Backdating options to a time when a stock’s price was 
lower than its current value puts them immediately “in the 
 
70 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Five More Companies Show Questionable 
Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A1.  In that story, the Journal 
included a chart showing options grants to five CEOs, with three particularly 
favorable grant dates for each.  Id.  Right after each grant there was a big jump in 
the stock price.  The Journal calculated the odds that such a pattern would occur by 
chance if the grant dates had been given at random without any attempt to pick 
times where the stock was trading at a low point.  For Frank Lin, the CEO of 
Trident Microsystems, and Sam Brooks, the CEO of Rental Care Group, the odds 
were one to 100 million that they would be so fortunate.  Id.  Likewise, the chances 
that Ken Levy, Founder and CEO of KLA-Tencor, E.Y. Snowden of Boston 
Communications Group, and John Diebel, founder of Meade Instruments, would 
be so lucky were respectively one in 20 million, one in 5 million, and one in 800,000.  
Id. 
71 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Opinion, How Backdating Is Like a 1980s 
“Rockumentary,” WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2006, at A11. 
72 Mark Maremont et al., Companies Say Backdating Used in Days After 9/11, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2007, at A1. 
73 See Patrick Richard et al., Backdating Is Not Always Fraudulent:  How to 
Distinguish Between Lawful and Fraudulent Ratification, ANDREWS CORP. 
OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. LITIG. REP., Sept. 7, 2006, available on Westlaw at, 22 No. 
5 ANCODLLR 2. 
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money,” i.e., their holders recognize gain right away.74  If those 
options were validly approved by the board as a form of 
executive compensation, properly expensed on the company’s 
financial statements, and accurately disclosed in the firm’s 
required public filings,75 there would appear to be no violation of 
corporate or securities law. 
Commentators, however, have effectively debunked the 
probability of such proper treatment.  As one succinctly put it: 
[T]he whole point of backdating is to pretend that you’re not 
granting in-the-money options when in fact you are.  And to 
say it’s up to the bean-counters to catch this situation is silly, 
because the whole reason you’re using phony dates is so that 
the bean-counters won’t know what you really did.
76
 
Announcing the indictment of former executives of Comverse 
Technology, Inc., Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty made 
this blunt judgment:  “When options are backdated to a time 
when the share price was lower, and without honest disclosure, 
those options are simply theft from shareholders.”77  As of 
March 2007, more than 140 companies were under investigation 
for this practice, and more than seventy corporate officials had 
been fired or resigned because of it.78 
5.  Board Complicity 
All this would not have happened if directors who are 
supposed to oversee executive behavior had been doing their 
jobs.  But as Ted White, a consultant to the Council of 
 
74 Jenkins, supra note 71.  Jenkins speculates that much of the backdating was 
motivated by employee preferences for “in the money” options.  Id.  Such actions 
might be legal if approved by the board, publicly disclosed, and properly recorded 
in the company’s financial statements.  Yet, as Jenkins admits, companies appear to 
have routinely “duck[ed] the prescribed accounting.”  Id. 
75 Under rules and forms promulgated by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 
(2006), companies are required to disclose material features of their executive 
compensation plans, including option grants.  Items 10(a)(1) and 10(b)(2) of 
Schedule 14A govern matters that must be disclosed in proxy statements.  In July 
2006, the SEC went one step further, requiring companies to specifically disclose 
instances of options backdating in their proxy statements.  See supra note 33. 
76 Roger Parloff, On the Theory That Backdating’s Not Illegal if You Account for 
It Correctly, FORTUNE, Apr. 26, 2007, http://legalpad.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2007/ 
04/26/on-the-theory-that-backdatings-not-illegal-if-you-account-for-it-correctly/. 
77 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Stock-Options Criminal Charge:  Slush Fund 
and Fake Employees, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2006, at A1. 
78 Maremont et al., supra note 72. 
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Institutional Investors, put it, “A ‘deeply troubling’ aspect of the 
stock options controversy . . . is ‘the possibility that some boards 
were complicit in this.’”79 
Typically, separate committees deal with a firm’s audit and 
the compensation of its officers.  The former is in charge of the 
annual certification of the company’s financial statements by an 
outside accounting firm, and the latter recommends and reviews 
the pay packages of its top officials.80  Both should be comprised 
of members who are independent of management, and together 
they should make it impossible for company officials to engage 
in such patently dishonest behavior as options backdating.81  
And those committees should be made up of different directors 
so they can check each other and make sure that their oversight 
functions are performed effectively.82 
If those directors are to do their jobs, they must, of course, 
have the necessary information on executive compensation and 
scrutinize it carefully.  As the former chief accountant of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) said about 
directors who are derelict in those monitoring responsibilities, 
“If you knew those grants were being awarded on a backdated 
basis and you didn’t say anything about it when you are sitting 
 
79 Scandal over Stock Options Widens, MSNBC, June 9, 2006, http://www.msnbc 
.msn.com/id/13231111/. 
80 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation required the SEC to make rules 
governing the independence of audit committees for companies whose securities are 
listed on a stock exchange or the NASDAQ.  The SEC promulgated such rules in 
Standards Relating to Listing Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 68 Fed. Reg. 
18,788 (Apr. 25, 2003).  The SEC promulgated similar rules pertaining to the 
independence of compensation committees in NASD and NYSE Rulemaking:  
Related to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
81 A board that is hostile to management can have its problems too.  As one 
commentator puts it, “Boards also need to be a place where a chief executive officer 
can discuss weaknesses and ask for help.”  George Anders, A Healthy Boardroom 
Is United and Focused on Lending a Hand, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at B1 
(quoting Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, head of the Chief Executive Leadership Institute at 
Yale University).  The Anders article goes on to discuss the hostility between 
former Hewlett-Packard board chair Patricia Dunn and certain directors, which led 
to her ouster after it was revealed that she had hired investigators to spy on some 
board members.  See id. 
82 See Dash, supra note 59. 
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on the audit committee, it would be most appropriate for the 
S.E.C. to take you out and hang you high from the oak tree.”83 
Boards of two prominent companies serve as egregious 
examples of such lax oversight.  At UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 
the country’s second-largest health care insurer, CEO Dr. 
William McGuire resigned after it was disclosed that he had 
received twelve grants of options in the company’s stock 
between 1994 and 2002, each dated right before a run-up in the 
share price.84  By the end of 2005 he had amassed gains of 
approximately $1.8 billion.85 
As it happened, Dr. McGuire got some of those lucrative 
options from a compensation committee headed by a New York 
investment manager who was listed as an independent director 
in the company’s proxy statement.86  However, that official also 
managed money for Dr. McGuire’s children, and Dr. McGuire 
had put up $500,000 to help him reacquire ownership of his firm 
from a larger concern.87  Former New Jersey Governor Thomas 
H. Kean was another member of UnitedHealth’s compensation 
committee.88  His son, a candidate for the U.S. Senate in 2006, 
received $25,000 in campaign contributions from officials of the 
company.89 
In March 2007, UnitedHealth announced a restatement of its 
earnings from 1994 to 2002, admitting that it had “used incorrect 
measurement dates and made other errors” in options grants 
involving about 390 million shares given to various employees.90  
 
83 Id. (quoting Lynn E. Turner). 
84 James Bandler & Charles Forelle, In Internal Probes of Stock Options, 
Conflicts Abound, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2006, at A1. 
85 Id.  For subsequent litigation involving options backdating at UnitedHealth, 
see supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 Dr. McGuire also makes a cameo appearance in the recent movie Sicko by 
Michael Moore, which describes the inadequacies of the American health care 
system and the refusal of organizations like UnitedHealth to honor claims for 
certain medical treatment.  SICKO (Lionsgate 2007). 




90 Laura B. Benko, Options Cut United Profits, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 12, 
2007, at 22, 22. 
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The effect on the firm’s bottom line was to reduce its pretax 
profit by $1.56 billion.91 
At the end of 2006, Apple Computer revealed that it had 
improperly made almost 6500 grants of options on forty-two 
dates during a five year period, acknowledging that options 
backdating was a pervasive practice at that prominent 
company.92  It also revealed that Steve Jobs, the company’s 
famed CEO, was “aware or recommended” favorable dates on 
some of the grants.93 
Yet an investigating committee of the company’s board, 
including former Vice President Al Gore, concluded that it had 
“complete confidence in Steve Jobs and the senior management 
team.”94  A number of options and corporate governance 
experts, however, said that they could not reconcile Apple’s 
statements defending Jobs with its disclosures about his 
complicity in the fraud.95  Jobs remains under investigation by 
federal officials.96 
In April 2007, the SEC filed charges against two former Apple 
officials, General Counsel Nancy R. Heinen and CFO Fred D. 
Anderson, for improper options backdating.97  Among other 
things, the SEC alleged that Heinin signed fictitious minutes 
backdating 7.5 million options given to Jobs for a board meeting 
that never took place.98  According to the SEC, both Heinin and 
Anderson themselves received millions of dollars in unreported 
compensation as a result of the backdating.99  Anderson settled 
his action with the SEC by agreeing to pay approximately $3.5 
million in disgorgement and penalties.100 
 
91 Id. 
92 Nick Wingfield et al., Jobs Helped Pick “Favorable” Dates for Option Grants, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30–31, 2006, at A1. 
93 Marmaro & Weinstein, supra note 51. 
94 Id. 
95 Wingfield et al., supra note 92. 
96 Marmaro & Weinstein, supra note 51. 
97 SEC v. Heinen, No. 07-2214-HRL (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2007), 2007 SEC LEXIS 
783, at *1. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at *1–2. 
100 Id. 
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C.  Some Remedies for Backdating 
1.  Government Actions 
An SEC official told a congressional panel in September 2006 
that the SEC was investigating over 100 companies for possible 
fraudulent reporting of stock option grants.101  By March of 2007, 
however, several members of Congress criticized the SEC for its 
slow pace in those actions.102  The hang-up appeared to be an 
internal debate at the SEC on the appropriate fines to be 
assessed.  That dispute centered on whether a company should 
be penalized when its officers do wrong.103  The SEC was also 
said to be stymied by difficulty in fixing the exact damage each 
backdating incident had caused.104 
The Department of Justice, in contrast, announced its first 
criminal indictment for options backdating on July 20, 2006.105  
Its targets were officers of Brocade Communications Systems, a 
Silicon Valley maker of switching devices for data storage 
systems.106  At the same time, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Northern District of California also announced the formation of 
a task force to investigate options backdating.107  A number of 
companies have since reported receiving grand jury subpoenas 
 
101 DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND OPTIONS BACKDATING 
PRACTICES (2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606lt.htm.  
A month earlier, SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos said in a speech about 
options backdating, “If the facts permit . . . it wouldn’t surprise me to see charges 
brought against outside directors.”  Dash, supra note 59. 
102 Kara Scannell, Options Fines:  A Hard Call, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at C1. 
103 That issue has been dividing the SEC for some time.  See Kara Scannel, Cox’s 
Penalty Framework Is Slowing SEC Cases, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2007, at C1. 
104 See Scannell, supra note 102. 
105 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Brocade Ex-CEO, 2 Others Charged in 
Options Probe, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006, at A1. 
106 Id. 
107 John C. Grugan & Alison Tanchyk Dante, DOJ and SEC Options Backdating 
Investigations Net First Indictments, WHITE COLLAR LITIG. & SEC. ALERT (Ballard 
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Phila., Pa.), July 26, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/files/tbl_s11Newsletters/PDFFile142/750/7-26-06 
.White%20Collar%20Litigation%20alert.pdf. 
 In 2007, Gregory Reyes, Brocade’s former CEO, was convicted for falsifying the 
company’s financial statements in connection with a scheme to backdate options in 
Brockade’s stock.  Former CEO to Serve 21 Months for Backdating, MSNBC, Jan. 
16, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22685773/.  On January 16, 2008, he was 
sentenced to twenty-one months in prison.  Id. 
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related to options backdating, not only from that office but also 
from U.S. Attorneys in the Southern and Eastern Districts of 
New York.108 
2.  Direct Shareholder Suits 
With the ubiquitous nature of this deceitful activity, it may be 
hard for government authorities to prosecute more than a 
fraction of the actual wrongdoing.109  One alternative remedy 
might be a direct securities fraud class action claim by 
shareholders.110  However, such suits do not seem to offer 
effective relief in options backdating situations. 
In a direct shareholder action for securities fraud under 
federal law, an investor must show, among other things,111 that 
the defendants’ wrongdoing caused her economic loss.112  The 
loss is usually alleged to have occurred because the fraud caused 
the stock’s price to be inflated and to fall when the true facts 
 
108 Keller-Rohrback Law Offices, Practice Areas:  Stock Option Backdating, 
http://www.krclassaction.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1464 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
109 While the Author was a junior attorney in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
in the late 1970s, he was told that the SEC could only investigate approximately two 
percent of ongoing wrongdoing in the business world. 
 As two commentators recently put it in the context of shareholder suits for 
corporate wrongdoing, “[D]oes anyone seriously doubt that there is immense 
deterrent power in the contemporary class action?  Executives tempted to lie about 
earnings are more concerned about Bill Lerach and Melvyn Weiss [renowned 
shareholder lawyers] than they are about the Securities and Exchange    
Commission . . . .”  Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action 
Agency Costs Myth:  The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103, 106 (2006). 
 Bill Lerach was sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty to making 
misrepresentations to the court that no special compensation was paid to lead 
plaintiffs in his class action suits on behalf of shareholders.  Lerach Pleads Guilty in 
Milberg Bribe Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at B11.  For an interesting interview 
with Mr. Lerach about his practice, see Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron, 
NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 86, 86–94. 
110 The most effective way to bring such a claim is the private right of action 
allowed under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  For a thorough 
discussion of the elements of such an action and their pitfalls, see generally DONNA 
M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 19–259 (2003). 
111 The elements of such an action are:  “(1) a material misrepresentation (or 
omission) . . . ; (2) scienter, . . . (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security . . . ; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss . . . ; and (6) loss causation, i.e. a 
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”  Dura 
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (citations and emphasis 
omitted). 
112 Id. at 342. 
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were disclosed.113  There has, however, been no uniform 
response in stock prices when backdating is announced.  Some 
companies’ shares have declined while others have not.114 
Even if a company’s stock has substantially declined after 
backdating is made public, there is no automatic presumption 
that such a drop was due to the fraud.115  As one leading 
defender of such suits has commented, “Economists and 
econometricians should be able to analyze this data and show 
that the observed stock price declines were due to factors other 
than the disclosure of the accounting adjustments.”116 
II 
DERIVATIVE SUITS 
A.  The Best Remedy for Financial Fraud 
1.  The Nature of the Action 
Because of the shortcomings of governmental and direct 
shareholder actions, a derivative suit is a more promising way to 
redress the grievances of stockholders hurt by options 
backdating.117  In a derivative suit, a shareholder brings suit on 
behalf of the corporation against the officers and directors 
whose actions have harmed the company.118  The plaintiff 
 
113 This is the so-called fraud on the market theory.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
114 Marc H. Folladori, Stock Option Backdating:  Regulators and Plaintiffs Take 
the Controversy to the Next Level (Client Memo), 1578 PLI/CORP 659, 664 (2007). 
115 The misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of the stock’s fall, and 
many other factors may exist that might cause it to decline subsequent to the 
announcement.  See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342. 
116 Folladori, supra note 114, at 664. 
117 Beth Bar, “Biggest Thing Going”:  Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Jockey for Backdating 
Cases, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2006, at 5.  It has not always been easy to distinguish a 
derivative suit from a direct one.  Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative 
Actions:  From Cradle to Grave, 1557 PLI/CORP 125, 131–37 (2006).  Earlier courts 
said that “distinct injury” to a shareholder was necessary for the latter.  See, e.g., 
Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2002).  However, in 2004 the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated its disapproval of that distinction and said that the matter 
should turn on:  (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing 
shareholders directly), and (2) who would receive the recovery.  Tooley v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). 
118 For discussions of the justifications for derivative suits, see generally Aronson 
v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Daniel J. Morrissey, New Rulings Threaten the 
Derivative Suit–Will the “Needed Policeman” Keep Walking the Beat?, 36 S.C. L. 
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shareholder thus serves as a “self-appointed champion of the 
corporate right.”119  The action consists of two separate claims.  
First, the shareholder must sue the corporation as a nominal 
defendant for refusing to pursue its rights.120  Second, she asserts 
the corporation’s claim on its behalf against the wrongdoers.121 
Even the threat of such a suit can keep management honest 
and properly attentive to shareholder concerns.  Some years ago, 
one commentator called derivative actions a “needed 
policeman,”122 citing the reasoning of an earlier court that such 
actions have done much to “educate corporate directors in the 
principles of fiduciary responsibility and undivided loyalty.”123  
Judge Wyzanski perhaps put the justification for derivative suits 
best:  “[I]t is recognized that while minority [shareholders] are 
often actuated by selfish interests, they . . . become the most 
effective instruments for ferreting out wrongdoing, for pursuing 
it publicly and for giving point to the only sanctions actual and 
potential wrongdoers fear.”124 
Since the corporation, although the nominal defendant, is the 
party seeking relief, the action must allege the harm done to it.  
In the case of options backdating, the harm includes breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment by the corporate 
officials, who are the true defendants.125  As Chancellor 
Chandler ruled in a recent opinion from Delaware, options 
backdating provides a windfall for officers and directors by 
reducing the strike price in clear violation of shareholder-
approved plans.126  It is hard to conceive of a more flagrant 
 
REV. 631 (1985); Bradley T. Ferrell, Note, A Hybrid Approach:  Integrating the 
Delaware and the ALI Approaches to Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 241 (1999). 
119 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 387 (2000). 
120 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). 
121 Id.  In Ross, the Supreme Court extended the right of trial by jury to 
shareholders in a derivative suit when the underlying claim, had it been asserted by 
the corporation, would have been tried by a jury.  Id. at 542.  See generally Bert S. 
Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit:  Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 980 (1957) (discussing the origins of the derivative suit in nineteenth-century 
English and American law). 
122 Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 78 
(1967). 
123 Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
124 Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. 1951). 
125 See Folladori, supra note 114, at 663. 
126 Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 354–55 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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breach of the duties of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty by 
corporate officials.127 
2.  A Good Tool for Backdating Cases 
In such cases, damages should consist of any illegal 
compensation received in violation of the authorized plans.  But 
other harms to corporations, such as declines in the price of a 
company’s stock proximately caused by fraudulent practices, 
should be remedied too.128  It is not unusual for share prices in 
situations of outrageous management fraud to be downgraded 
by the so-called “liars’ discount.”  The market loses confidence 
in the integrity of management and punishes the company’s 
stock.129 
Often, relief in these actions may also come in the form of 
therapeutic changes to a company’s governance structure.  
Courts in such cases have found that litigation produces a 
substantial benefit for corporations by obtaining changes that 
will prevent future misconduct.130  Attorneys’ fees are set either 
 
127 One defense attorney argues that a company might not be harmed by options 
backdating.  If the options were not backdated, Marc H. Folladori says, the firm 
might have had to pay cash to compensate the employees at the appropriate level.  
Folladori, supra note 114, at 663.  Or, perhaps the market was somehow able to 
intuit the true cost of the options by reading certain information in the company’s 
financial statements.  Id.  Both of those defenses, however, fly in the face of basic 
rules of corporate law requiring honest and accurate disclosure of all corporate 
expenses.  Such action is thus tantamount to an employee who believes he is 
underpaid reaching into the firm’s cash register and sticking money in his pocket. 
 Along the same lines, Folladori argues that backdating could have occurred 
because of “administrative problems” (late approval by directors or shareholders).  
Id.  Administrative problems, of course, look suspiciously like attempts to get one’s 
friends to help cover up earlier improprieties. 
128 As of May 2006, companies that acknowledged backdating have lost nearly 
$35 billion in stock value.  Dawes & Sorrell, supra note 26, at 645.  Prominent 
examples include Mercury Interactive Corp., whose stock dropped twenty-five 
percent on the news of backdating, and Comverse Technology, whose stock fell 
twenty-two percent.  Id. 
129 See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, GLOBAL INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY:  KEY 
FINDINGS 2 (2002), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ 
organizationleadership/service/corpgovernance/pdf/globalinvestoropinionsurvey200
2.pdf.  A study by the international consulting firm McKinsey & Company surveyed 
a number of institutional investors and found that over seventy-five percent of them 
would be willing to pay a premium for the shares of companies that were well 
governed.  Id. at 5. 
130 See, e.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1968); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
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by a percentage of the recovery or at an hourly rate that takes 
into account not only the time counsel worked but also the risk 
and degree of difficulty that the case entailed.131 
3.  A Controversial Remedy 
Despite its obvious advantage to redress corporate 
wrongdoing in situations like options backdating, the derivative 
suit is a complicated mechanism replete with difficult 
requirements for its effective maintenance.  Almost all of those 
complexities are owed to a fundamental question:  who is the 
appropriate advocate to prosecute the corporation’s grievances 
against its internal malefactors? 
In theory, of course, management of a corporation is vested in 
its board of directors,132 and that responsibility also includes the 
decision whether to pursue legal action against those who have 
harmed it.  But the driving presumption of a derivative suit is 
that those in control of the corporation have either committed 
the wrongful act themselves or have effectively condoned it.  
Such officials are unlikely to sue themselves. 
Yet considerable skepticism exists about the bona fide 
motivations of shareholder-plaintiffs or more particularly about 
the motivations of their counsel.  Corporate defendants are 
quick to claim that these are “strike suits,” frivolous litigation 
brought without merit by lawyers hungry for big, quick 
settlements.133 
 
131 See GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 424–25.  As a fine recent piece of 
scholarship has argued, these lawyers earn their compensation by serving as 
effective deterrents for corporate wrongdoing.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 109, 
at 111.  For that proposition, the authors cite the eminent father of the law and 
economics school, Judge Richard Posner, who wrote regarding class action suits, 
“[T]he most important point, on an economic analysis, is that the violator be 
confronted with the costs of his violation–this achieves the allocative purpose of 
the suit–not that he pay them to his victims.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 349–50 (1972). 
132 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1994). 
133 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Litigation Without Foundation?, 
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55–56 (1991). 
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B.  A Major Procedural Hurdle:  The Demand Requirement 
1.  How Demand Is Justified 
The law has evolved a testing device to separate ex ante the 
wheat (meritorious claims) from the chaff (frivolous strike suits).  
Before bringing the action, the shareholder must first initiate it 
by making a demand on the board.134  According to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the shareholder must specifically 
allege the efforts she has made to get redress from the board.135  
If she has failed to get such a result, she must state why that is so 
or alternatively give her reasons for not making the effort.136 
That “demand requirement” has a number of justifications.  It 
is said to recognize the directors’ rightful prerogative to run the 
affairs of the company by letting them judge whether such a suit 
is in the firm’s best interest.137  It presumptively also allows them 
to employ the company’s ample resources to pursue the 
wrongdoers and make a decision about whether the matter can 
be settled without litigation, thus promoting judicial economy.138  
It may also spur the board to take corrective action.139 
Such is the theory, but in practice boards typically reject 
demands out of hand, claiming that these suits are not in the 
corporation’s best interest.140  At least in Delaware, the 
preeminent jurisdiction for corporate litigation, two unhelpful 
results are apt to occur if the plaintiff makes a demand and it is 
refused, as is likely.  Both flow from the belief that by making a 
demand the shareholder has implicitly conceded that the board 
is independent from the wrongdoing and thus capable of 
objectively evaluating the matter. 
First, any challenge to the board’s refusal to bring the suit will 
meet a formidable barrier in the business judgment rule.  Under 
 
134 Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1974).  The formalities of 
demand are relatively simple.  Mailing a copy of the complaint to the board and 
demanding that it commence the action will likely satisfy the requirement.  Id.  The 
directors’ failure to respond in a reasonable time will constitute a refusal to sue.  Id. 
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
136 Id. 
137 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.01(b) (stating management of a corporation is vested in its board of directors). 
138 Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247–48 (2d Cir. 1983). 
139 Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1982). 
140 RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION:  
BESIEGING THE BOARD § 7.02 (2007). 
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the presumption of that doctrine, so long as the directors’ 
decision is made in good faith and upon a reasonable 
investigation, it is almost unassailable.141 
Second, once demand has been refused, the shareholder is 
also foreclosed from arguing that the demand requirement 
should have been excused as futile.  According to Delaware law, 
by making the demand the shareholder has acknowledged that 
the board is free from conflicting bias.142  As one federal 
appellate court has put it, “[e]xcept in extraordinary cases . . . 
tendering a demand to the board puts the plaintiff out of court 
under Delaware law.”143 
2.  Excusing Demand 
It would therefore behoove a plaintiff shareholder, if possible, 
to avoid demand altogether.  She can do so in Delaware and 
other jurisdictions that follow its lead by alleging that the 
demand requirement should be excused as futile.144  Such is 
certainly the case if the board is too conflicted to take action 
against the wrongdoers.  And it is also true if most of the 
directors were complicit in the illegality or under the control of 
the culpable parties. 
Although the Federal Rules also contemplate that 
possibility,145 there is another school of thought, advanced by 
 
141 See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990); see also infra notes 
186–88 and accompanying text. 
142 In Spiegel, the court also reasoned that the shareholder was estopped from 
claiming futility after making the demand because he was implicitly agreeing that 
the directors would act fairly.  See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 775; see also Levine v. Smith, 
591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991).  However, the Delaware Supreme Court seems to 
have indicated its willingness to reconsider that reasoning by a reference in Grimes 
v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).  In Grimes, the court stated that a plaintiff 
who makes a demand does not concede that the board “acted independently, 
disinterestedly or with due care” in the matter.  Id. at 1219 (emphasis omitted). 
143 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d 
on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991).  Professor John Coffee details many 
traps for a plaintiff facing the demand requirement, particularly those that may 
arise from his making a demand instead of alleging that it is futile.  See John C. 
Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities:  The American Law Institute Faces the 
Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407, 1414 (1993). 
144 See infra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
145 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, covering derivative suits, states in part: 
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made 
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors 
or comparable authority, and, if necessary, from the shareholders or 
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both the American Law Institute and the Model Business 
Corporation Act, that would require demand at all times.146  
Such an approach is justified as allowing the board a last clear 
chance to take corrective action and as recognizing its right, at 
least in theory, to control the firm’s litigation.147 
However, the requirement of universal demand and the 
Delaware rule allowing it to be excused may amount to much 
the same thing.148  In a universal demand jurisdiction, if a board 
refuses to sue after a demand, the plaintiff must show by 
particularized pleadings why her derivative suit should go 
forward.149  That burden is just like the one facing a derivative 
plaintiff in Delaware who claims that demand should be excused.  
Shareholders in both situations must convince the court that the 
board should not be allowed the final say on the matter.150 
3.  The Standard in Both Jurisdictions 
The Delaware Supreme Court articulated its standard for 
demand futility in Aronson v. Lewis.151  As the court put it in less 
than straightforward language, for demand to be excused the 
plaintiff must plead facts raising a “reasonable doubt . . . that (1) 
directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the 
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid 
 
members, and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or 
for not making the effort. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (emphasis added). 
146 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1994); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994).  The Author took a similar position in an earlier piece 
on derivative suits.  See Morrissey, supra note 118, at 656.  Nineteen states require 
this universal demand.  Aronson et al., supra note 117, at 148. 
147 GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 409–10; see also supra notes 137–39 and 
accompanying text. 
148 One possible benefit of requiring universal demand is that it could eliminate 
the trap whereby the plaintiff, by making demand, loses his opportunity to claim 
that it should be excused, and thus must meet a higher standard to maintain the 
action.  See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.  But see Byron F. Egan & 
Curtis W. Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation–Texas Versus Delaware:  Is It 
Now Time to Rethink Traditional Notions?,  54 SMU L. REV. 249, 316 (2001) 
(noting that corporate defendants may prefer a state requiring universal demand 
because it creates an additional hurdle to a shareholder suit). 
149 One commentator has thus recommended a fusion of the two approaches that 
would keep the requirement of universal demand but require a court to evaluate 
the reasonableness of the board’s rejection.  See Ferrell, supra note 118, at 276–80. 
150 See GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 402. 
151 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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exercise of business judgment.”152  The two prongs are 
alternatives,153 and the second one would seem the steeper 
hurdle because the plaintiff would have to show that the board 
acted in bad faith or was grossly negligent in failing to 
investigate the matter.154 
For a plaintiff to satisfy the easier first standard, she must 
show that the directors are not disinterested or independent.  
Another Delaware decision provided guidance there, noting, 
“[d]irectorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are 
present, or a director either has received, or is entitled to 
receive, a personal financial benefit from the challenged 
transaction which is not equally shared by the stockholders.”155  
And, as a later Delaware opinion added, such “[r]easonable 
doubt must be decided by the trial court on a case-by-case basis 
employing an objective analysis.”156 
Much the same type of showing is necessary for a shareholder 
suit to proceed upon board refusal in a universal demand 
jurisdiction.  The plaintiff must counter assertions from the 
directors that they were not conflicted in the transaction or 
under the control of the culpable party.157  In states like 
Delaware that allow demand to be excused, that must also be 
done by particular facts. 
Thus, unlike a typical suit where notice pleading is 
sufficient,158 courts in derivative actions require more detailed 
allegations if the case is to go forward.  In 1995, Congress 
 
152 Id. at 814. 
153 See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 197–98 (Del. 1991). 
154 See infra notes 202–20 and accompanying text.  The chancellor further refined 
the second prong in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, ruling that for 
demand to be excused, “plaintiffs must plead particularized facts sufficient to raise 
(1) a reason to doubt that the action was taken honestly and in good faith or (2) a 
reason to doubt that the board was adequately informed in making the decision.  
825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 To the surprise of some, the chancellor found that the facts as alleged could allow 
a conclusion “that the defendant directors’ conduct fell outside the protection of the 
business judgment rule.”  Id. at 289.  After a full trial, however, the chancellor 
found otherwise, and that finding was upheld on appeal.  In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see 
also infra notes 211–20 and accompanying text. 
155 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). 
156 Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186. (Del. 1988). 
157 See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957). 
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amended the federal securities laws to mandate similar 
heightened pleading standards in direct shareholder actions for 
fraud.159  In the corporate area, it seems that policy makers are 
particularly concerned about the possibility of vexatious 
litigation,160 so-called “strike suits” brought without evidentiary 
foundation to extract quick settlements from wealthy corporate 
executives who are said to be preoccupied by other matters.161  
Yet the same claim could be made for many other types of suits, 
particularly various types of class actions.162  The real issue here, 
some have claimed, is that the principal beneficiaries of both 
derivative suits and direct shareholder suits are the lawyers who 
maintain them.  They allegedly do so without much concern that 
the corporation or its shareholders really benefit.163 
Such suits, however, provide a much needed check on 
corporate corruption and malfeasance when, as is often the case, 
directors are too conflicted to police their own executives.164  
Courts seem to be trying to strike a balance between concerns 
that such actions may sometimes be less justified than others and 
a belief that they are also much needed when warranted.  Judges 
are disposed to do that in corporate/securities suits, it appears, 
by prejudging the bona fide motivations of these actions in their 
early stages. 
The real issue in both universal demand jurisdictions and 
those that will excuse it is simply this:  how much detail should a 
plaintiff have to allege in her pleadings to overcome a 
presumption that the directors are capable of objectively 
 
159 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737.  See generally NAGY ET AL., supra note 110, at 395–405 (discussing the Act). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court recently reenforced the notion that pleadings in such 
actions must present cogent and compelling inferences that the defendants acted 
with scienter.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., No. 06-484, slip op. at 2 
(U.S. June 21, 2007). 
160 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Justice Rehnquist stated, “There 
has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger 
of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies 
litigation in general.” 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).  The Court held that there must be 
an actual purchase or sale of a security for there to be a claim under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 730, 749. 
161 See Romano, supra note 133, at 55–56. 
162 See GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 426. 
163 The financial success of William Lerach, one high-profile practitioner in this 
area, is cited to substantiate that point.  See Toobin, supra note 109. 
164 See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
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evaluating the merits of these suits?165  On that point one thing is 
clear:  merely naming a majority of the directors as defendants 
or suing a party who can control them is not enough to show 
such a conflict.166  And even claiming that a majority of them are 
connected with the culpable party through business or social ties 
will not do it either.167 
C.  A Second Obstacle:  The Special Litigation Committee 
1.  How It Operates 
Even if a shareholder-plaintiff can convince a court that the 
board, as a whole, is unsuited to manage the derivative litigation, 
clever defense counsel have devised another method for the 
company’s management to take the suit away from her.  That 
ploy is also premised on the directors’ prerogative to manage the 
affairs of the company.  It makes use of the well-established 
norm that boards can act through their committees.168 
Beginning in the late 1970s, defendant directors whose 
independence might be compromised began setting up special 
committees of the board to take charge of derivate litigation.169  
Those groups were usually composed of individuals who came 
onto the board after the questionable transactions occurred.  
 
165 In the case that established the Delaware test to excuse demand, Aronson v. 
Lewis, the board authorized payments and fees to a director who owned forty-seven 
percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock.  473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984).  The 
court found that neither the amount of stock owned by the directors alone nor the 
allegation that he selected all the directors was enough to excuse demand.  Id. at 
816–18; see also GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 410–11. 
166 Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1983).  For a case where a court 
found that the shareholder plaintiff had raised a reasonable doubt as to the 
disinterestedness or independence of at least six of the company’s twelve directors, 
see In re Limited Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 
537692, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).  The Limited Inc. court goes through a 
director-by-director analysis of the bias that could result from each director being 
controlled by the majority shareholder.  Id. 
167 In Beam v. Stewart, a shareholder of Martha Stewart’s company brought a 
derivative action against her for breach of her fiduciary duties to the company in 
connection with her alleged insider trading and other illegal activity.  845 A.2d 1040, 
1044 (Del. 2004).  When the shareholder sought to have demand excused, his 
motion was denied because a majority of the board were outside directors deemed 
to be independent even though they were “longstanding personal friend[s]” of Ms. 
Stewart and she held ninety-four percent voting power in the company.  Id. at 1051. 
168 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2001). 
169 This process was first approved by the Supreme Court in Burks v. Lasker, 441 
U.S. 471, 480–83 (1979). 
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They therefore were arguably untainted by approving them.  
The new directors were best suited, it was said, to evaluate those 
actions not only because they were supposedly independent but 
also because they were empowered by their office to set policy 
for their firms.170 
With such a mandate, a special litigation committee (“SLC”) 
would investigate the allegations of a derivative suit filed against 
its company and almost always recommend its dismissal, finding 
that its maintenance was not in the firm’s best interest.171  The 
SLC would make such a report to the full board, which would 
then present it to the court as management’s business 
judgment172 and move for dismissal of the action.173 
2.  Concerns About Independence 
Soon after that approach was adopted, the New York Court of 
Appeals said that in reviewing such motions its judges should 
only scrutinize the independence of an SLC.  If its members 
appeared free from conflicts, New York courts should grant 
motions sustaining the SLC’s business judgment, so long as the 
decision was ostensibly made with due care.174  Even under such 
a limited standard of review, however, getting a court to accept 
an SLC’s dismissal recommendation may not necessarily be a 
“slam dunk.”175  Two recent cases have shown that courts will 
take a hard look at the independence of SLC members. 
In Biondi v. Scrushy, the court found that the SLC was 
“fatally compromised” because of the members’ strong 
 
170 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) 
(1994). 
171 However, in one recent very prominent derivative suit arising out of the 
options backdating scandal, the special litigation committee of Mercury Interactive 
Corp. recommended that the shareholder suit go forward against one of the 
officers/defendants.  Daniel J. Morrissey, Options Backdating:  Derivative Suits as 
Remedy, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 16, 2006, at 26, 26. 
172 The directors would cite section 141 of title 8 of the Delaware Code, 
empowering the board to run the affairs of a corporation. 
173 In upholding that process, the Supreme Court deferred to state corporate law 
to determine whether the business judgment of such a committee should be 
controlling on the issue of dismissal.  Burks, 441 U.S. at 486. 
174 E.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979). 
175 With apologies to George Tenet, who had to defend that comment about the 
ease of an American invasion of Iraq in his book, At the Center of the Storm.  See 
Jeffrey Goldberg, Woodward vs. Tenet, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2007, at 32, 32. 
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friendship with a key defendant, inadequate delegation of 
authority to the SLC, and a premature statement by its chair that 
one key defendant would be exonerated.176  Similarly, in In re 
Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the court found an 
impermissible conflict in judgment because two SLC members 
were professors at Stanford, a university where all of the 
defendants had important ties.177 
3.  Beyond Independence 
From the early years of SLCs, Delaware and other tribunals 
that followed its lead not only scrutinized the independence of 
SLCs but also refused to give unqualified deference to their 
substantive recommendations.  After all, members of an SLC are 
appointed by the very individuals who are defendants in the 
derivative suit, a process not unlike letting an accused select his 
jury.178  Even beyond that, as the Delaware high court 
realistically observed, there exists a natural “there but for the 
grace of God go I” empathy between SLC members and their 
fellow directors.179 
Delaware therefore adopted a two-prong test for examining 
an SLC’s motion to dismiss.  The first part, similar to that 
employed by New York, required the court to examine just the 
independence and good faith of the SLC.180  But Delaware went 
beyond that in the second part of its standard of review.  Its 
supreme court authorized trial judges to apply their own 
judgment to determine if dismissal of the action was in the 
company’s best interest.  In doing so, said the high court, trial 
courts should evaluate all the ramifications of such matters, the 
“ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee 
relations, fiscal [and] legal factors” involved.181 
 
176 Brandi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1156–57 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
177 In re Oracle Corp. Deriative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 947–48 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
178 The Supreme Court of Iowa saw that as a reason for disallowing SLCs 
altogether.  Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 
1983). 
179 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).  As one 
commentator phrased on natural bias, “Because of group psychology, non-
defendant directors normally will be sympathetic toward the defendant directors, 
and suspicious of the outsider plaintiff shareholder.”  GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 
431. 
180 Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 788. 
181 Id. (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit quickly 
followed suit, reenforcing the two-pronged approach taken by 
Delaware.182  It also elaborated on the assessment that a court 
should employ in determining the efficacy of such actions.  
Unlike the typical situation involving the business judgment rule, 
where the law is reluctant to second-guess the purely commercial 
decisions of corporate leaders, derivative suits implicate more 
than just dollars and cents. 
Along those lines, the court went out of its way to say that 
factors like the “negative impact on morale and upon the 
corporate image” should not be used as arguments for dismissal 
of the suit, “a spectacular fraud being generally more 
newsworthy and damaging to morale than a mistake in judgment 
as to the strength of consumer demand.”183  Implicit in these 
remarks was the court’s support for the role that derivative 
actions play in exposing corporate wrongdoing.184 
There appears to have been no reported decision, however, 
where courts have reviewed whether the dismissal 
recommendation of an SLC was in the best interest of its 
corporation.185  Rather, all the attention in derivative suits seems 
to be focused on whether demand should be excused.  If the 
plaintiff can leap that hurdle, a court should be predisposed to 
find the board interested and not independent, making it harder 
for any dismissal recommendation from an SLC to pass judicial 
muster. 
 
182 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891–92 (2d Cir. 1982). 
183 Id. at 892. 
184 The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) and the American Law 
Institute (“ALI”) deal with SLCs in a nuanced fashion.  The MBCA adopts the first 
part of Delaware’s test and then requires that members of an SLC be appointed by 
a majority of the independent directors.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 (1994).  
The ALI proposes different levels of judicial review for the recommendations of 
SLCs.  The most stringent is that a court not dismiss suits where the defendants 
gained significant improper benefits unless the likely injury to the company from 
the suit significantly outweighs any impact on the public interest.  2 PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 7.07–7.10 (1994). 
185 GEVURTZ, supra note 119, at 434. 
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III 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE 
A.  The Rule That Isn’t a Rule 
1.  The Classic Statement 
Front and center in all these matters is the issue of how 
deferential courts should be to decisions by corporate 
executives.  That issue implicates management’s best friend, the 
business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule is a 
cornerstone principle of corporate law that protects business 
officials for improvident decision making.  It holds that so long 
as directors are not personally interested in the subject matter of 
decisions, courts should uphold them.186 
Even though corporate officials are expected to exercise due 
care in running their companies,187 the law has never evaluated 
their decision making by ordinary tort principles.  Business is 
risky, choices have to be made, and some do not turn out so well.  
To hold executives responsible for purely commercial 
judgments, so the reasoning goes, would expose them to a 
Pandora’s box of potential liability.  Rather, the law should 
respect management’s business decisions and exempt them from 
legal accountability, even if those decisions have been wrong and 
have had harmful consequences for a company.188 
 
186 See generally id. at 278–88 (discussing business decisions and the business 
judgment rule).  For the ALI’s codification of these principles, see 2 PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01. 
 Two good recent articles on the business judgment rule are Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., 
Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, and D.A. Jeremy 
Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and Executive Compensation, 81 
TUL. L. REV. 829 (2007).  Telman discusses three conventional reasons for the rule:  
(1) deference to the board’s expertise, (2) the need to protect entrepreneurs, and 
(3) a belief that shareholders will ultimately hold the board accountable for their 
decisions.  He finds none of them convincing.  Id. at 841–65. 
187 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a). 
188 See Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project:  Of the Duty of 
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1238–42, 
1247 (1986).  Two classic cases applying the rule are Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 
N.W. 668, 684–85 (Mich. 1919) (expressing the court’s reluctance to review the 
firm’s dividend policy, but doing so anyway because of the large amounts of cash 
the company had accumulated), and Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780–81 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (declining to upset management’s decision not to install lights in 
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2.  Smith v. Van Gorkom 
In the mid 1980s, however, Delaware put a new spin on that 
old logic.  In the landmark case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, a 
majority of the Delaware Supreme Court found that a board of 
distinguished business leaders had failed to make an informed, 
deliberate decision in approving the sale of the company.189  
Rather, the board had merely rubber-stamped the wishes of 
their firm’s dominant chief executive officer who presented the 
matter to them as a fait accompli. 
In finding the directors liable for breaching their fiduciary 
duty, the Delaware court held that the business judgment rule 
would not protect boards that acted in such a grossly negligent 
fashion.190  It was not the board’s decision in Van Gorkom itself 
that so troubled the court, but the way it was made.  The 
business judgment rule would still protect the substantive 
strategies of management from judicial review, so long as they 
were taken after informed consideration.  The corporate 
decision-making process, said Van Gorkom, was the true focus 
of the business judgment rule and the dominant aspect of 
management’s duty of care.191 
3.  Legislative Reaction 
Ever eager to maintain its preeminence as America’s foremost 
state of incorporation, Delaware quickly acted to assuage any 
fears that management might have after Van Gorkom.  It 
amended the law governing the internal affairs of its corporate 
citizens by adding Section 102(b)(7), giving corporations the 
prerogative to change their certificates of incorporation to 
eliminate or limit directors’ liability for monetary damages.192 
 
a major league baseball park).  In Dodge, the court made this classic statement of 
the discretion afforded the board to run the business: 
There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to be 
exercised in good faith, the infinite details of business, including the wages 
which shall be paid to employees, the number of hours they shall work, the 
conditions under which labor shall be carried on, and the prices for which 
products shall be offered to the public. 
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
189 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 873. 
192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
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Such exculpation, however, could only extend to violations of 
a director’s duty of care.  It could not exclude liability for 
breaches of the duty of loyalty, or for acts or omissions not taken 
in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing 
violations of the law.  It also could not excuse liability for 
wrongly declared distributions or for transactions from which a 
director derived an improper personal benefit. 
Section 102(b)(7) became known as the “raincoat” provision.  
A similar article was added to the Model Business Corporations 
Act,193 and soon it was included in the corporate laws of almost 
all the states.194  But an influential Delaware jurist held that the 
provision would not give directors a blank check to avoid all 
responsibility for neglect of their duties.  In In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation,195 Chancellor Allen, 
approving the settlement of a derivative suit, ruled that “a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight 
. . . will establish [a] lack of good faith.”196 
B.  The Disney Proceedings 
1.  A Major Ruling 
The strains in derivative suits and business judgment litigation 
came to a head in 2006 in a significant case from Delaware, In re 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation.197  Shareholders 
alleged that directors of the famed entertainment company 
breached their fiduciary duty in two aspects of a hiring situation.  
They first blindly approved an employment agreement that the 
 
193 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (1994). 
194 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS, 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 699 (9th ed. 
2005). 
195 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
196 Id. at 971.  As recently as 2006, the Supreme Court of Delaware elaborated 
that bad faith may be shown where 
the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing 
the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the 
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties. 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
197 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 2007] The Path of Corporate Law 1009 
firm’s CEO, Michael Eisner, made appointing his longtime 
friend Michael Ovitz the company’s president.198  Second, after a 
year of lackluster and contention-filled performance by Ovitz, 
the directors then allegedly made matters worse by consenting to 
his termination without cause, costing the company 
approximately $130 million in prenegotiated severance pay.199 
The original complaint in the derivative action was dismissed 
for failure to make demand because the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated why demand would be futile.  Plaintiff 
shareholders, the chancellor ruled, were unable to satisfy either 
prong of the Aronson test.200  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court sustained the chancellor’s ruling that no reasonable doubt 
existed as to the board’s independence, but it gave the 
shareholders leave to replead as to Aronson’s alternative 
grounds for excusing demand,201 i.e., that the decision was other 
than a valid exercise of the board’s business judgment. 
2.  Preliminary Findings Excusing Demand 
After the plaintiff shareholders filed an amended complaint, 
the chancellor denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, 
holding that demand could be excused.202  He found that the new 
complaint alleged particularized facts showing a “knowing or 
intentional lack of due care”203 in the employment decisions at 
issue.  And the chancellor ruled that his finding was not 
precluded by the company’s exonerating raincoat provision 
because the Disney directors implicitly failed to “act in good 
faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention.”204 
Elaborating on that conclusion, the chancellor noted that 
Disney’s board had summarily approved the lush employment 
arrangement, and “did not ask any questions about the details of 
Ovitz’s salary, stock options, or possible termination.”205  He 
 
198 Id. at 46. 
199 Id. at 46, 57.  Eisner himself was ousted by a revolt of Disney’s shareholders in 
2005.  Laura M. Holson, From Hollywood to Eternity, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, § 
9, at 1. 
200 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 364–65 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
201 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000). 
202 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
203 Id. at 278. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 281. 
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then recounted Ovitz’s short, unimpressive performance as 
president and his falling out with Eisner and the rest of Disney’s 
top management.206  That falling out led to Ovitz’s no-fault 
termination and netted him “enormous financial benefits,”207 
which the court laid out in detail. 
The chancellor characterized the attitudes of both the full 
board and the compensation committee as an “ostrich-like 
approach,” because they were neither consulted nor gave their 
approval to Ovitz’s termination.208  While declaring his hesitancy 
to “second guess the business judgment of a disinterested and 
independent board of directors,”209 the chancellor nevertheless 
held that those alleged facts “belie[d] any assertion” that 
Disney’s boards “exercised any business judgment or made any 
good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed to 
Disney and its shareholders.”210 
The court preliminarily found that “the defendant directors 
consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, 
adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a 
material corporate decision.”211  In such a situation, the 
chancellor said, “the directors’ actions are either ‘not in good 
faith’ or ‘involve intentional misconduct.’”212 
3.  A Stunning Reversal at Trial, Affirmed on Appeal 
The initial ruling by the chancellor seemed to confirm, in the 
words of one observer, that the “business judgment rule [was] 
skat[ing] on thin ice.”213  As the “demand excused” procedure 
required,214 the chancellor had pre-tried the case and found the 
egregious behavior of the Disney directors outside the raincoat’s 
shelter.  Apparently sensing that any dismissal recommendation 
from an SLC would be futile, the defendants made no attempt to 
 
206 Id. at 288. 
207 Id. at 290. 
208 Id. at 288–89. 
209 Id. at 286–87. 
210 Id. at 287. 
211 Id. at 289. 
212 Id. at 290.  In finding potential liability, the court cited Delaware Corporation 
Code section 102(b)(7)(ii), which precludes a board from absolving itself of liability 
in such circumstances.  Id. 
213 James F. Carroll, Letter, Author’s Update, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 2006, at 4, 4. 
214 Supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text. 
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constitute such a subcommittee.  They nevertheless fought the 
matter all the way.  After a lengthy trial, the chancellor, in a 
startling about-face, ruled that the defendants’ conduct was 
protected by the business judgment rule after all, and his 
findings were upheld on appeal.215 
While their actions fell short of “best practices,”216 said the 
chancellor, the board’s compensation committee was adequately 
informed about the enormity of Ovitz’s potential payout when 
they approved it.217  Likewise, the Disney board had knowledge 
of Ovitz’s difficulty working with the rest of management and 
the likelihood that he could not be fired “for cause.”218  In the 
chancellor’s final assessment, therefore, the directors had 
enough facts to substantiate their approval of Ovitz’s no-fault 
termination. 
Both rulings were sustained on appeal against a claim of 
insufficient evidence.219  The board’s decisions were thus 
protected by the business judgment rule, and that presumption 
relieved them from any need to account to the shareholders for 
their actions.220  They therefore did not have to prove that 
Ovitz’s lush payments were fair to the company. 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Disney makes 
clear that the business judgment rule will stand as a barrier to 
judicial review of even grossly negligent board actions, so long as 
they are raincoat protected.  Yet the court failed to give 
directors an absolute carte blanche from legal responsibility. 
The court found that breaches of the duty of loyalty, improper 
personal benefits, and intentional misconduct cannot be 
sanitized by section 102(b)(7).  In addition, the court allowed 
that “bad faith,” another matter outside the raincoat’s pale, 
 
215 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
216 Professor Telman has rightly pointed out that this approach allows officers 
and directors “to tread very delicately near the line that separates poor 
management from wasteful mismanagement and thereby nullifies any incentive 
they might have to perform better.”  Telman, supra note 186, at 886–87. 
217 Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 697. 
218 Id. at 729. 
219 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 36 (Del. 2006). 
220 If the business judgment rule is rebutted, Delaware shifts the burden to 
defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of the challenged transaction to 
shareholders.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), 
decision modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
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could encompass something less than patently derelict behavior.  
For instance, it might apply to situations where directors are 
recklessly indifferent to the interests of the company or hold 
them in deliberate disregard.221 
4.  Delaware Jurisprudence After Disney 
One could explain away the Disney result by saying that the 
defendants did a better job of demonstrating their minimally 
sufficient involvement in the Ovitz matter at trial than at the 
pleading stage.  Or perhaps the court, upon hearing the 
evidence, came to believe that the entertainment industry is sui 
generis a law unto itself when it comes to compensating putative 
talent hunters. 
Alternately, the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney just 
might not have felt up to the task of challenging the practices of 
the business world as it once did in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where 
the court famously called a complacent board to account.  But in 
the aftermath of the Disney decision, it becomes a fair question 
whether Delaware law, under the rubric of the business 
judgment rule, will allow corporate operations to exist totally 
outside legal scrutiny. 
C.  The Business Judgment Rule in Options Backdating 
1.  A Time to Reassess the Standard 
Unless society is content to cede directors a free pass no 
matter how neglectful they are of their duties, such renegade 
behavior will have to once again be declared unacceptable.222  
The options backdating scandals present courts with a superb 
opportunity to step in and call a halt to a board’s outrageous 
disregard of its oversight responsibilities. 
One highly publicized case of options backdating shows how 
deeply involved directors may have typically been in this odious 
 
221 Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 99–102. 
222 As one observer succinctly put it, “Even when directors and officers are acting 
loyally and are properly incentivized to maximize profits, the company can struggle, 
and possibly go under, if corporate strategy is not properly tended to and if 
particular business opportunities are not properly evaluated.”  Troy Paredes, 
Sarbanes-Oxley & the New Corporate Governance, CTR. FOR INTERDISC. STUD. 
(Wash. Univ. Law, St. Louis, Mo.), Winter 2006–07, at 10, 12, available at 
http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/magazine/2006/fullversion.pdf. 
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practice.  Mercury Interactive, a Silicon Valley high-tech firm, 
issued a report finding that three of its former top executives 
“knew or should have known” that the options backdating that 
benefited them was “contrary to the options plan and proper 
accounting.”223  Further, the New York Times reported that three 
outside directors on the Mercury Interactive Board’s 
compensation committee were complicit in that corrupt practice 
since they “signed off” on the backdated options.224 
It is yet to be determined how pervasive such brazen 
directorial misconduct was.  Governmental and private 
investigations are now pending in over 100 companies under 
suspicion for this practice.225  As Chancellor Chandler of 
Delaware recently found, however, “[b]ackdating options 
qualifies as one of those ‘rare cases [in which] a transaction may 
be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the 
test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood of director 
liability therefore exists.’”226 
2.  Two Delaware Decisions on Options Fraud 
Chancellor Chandler made those comments in Ryan v. 
Gifford, a case containing allegations that three members of a 
board approved backdated options and another director 
accepted them.227  The action was brought as a derivative suit 
and came before the court on a motion to dismiss for the 
plaintiff’s failure to make demand.  The court denied the motion, 
finding that the pleadings were sufficient to raise doubt about 
the disinterestness of the board and its inability to consider such 
a demand with impartiality.228 
 
223 Dash, supra note 59. 
224 Id. 
225 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  As of January 26, 2007, between 
120 and 170 companies were implicated in lawsuits or investigations for this 
practice.  See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 350 n.15 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
226 Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355–56 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 
1984)). 
227 As evidence that the options were backdated, the plaintiff showed that the 
return on the options granted to management averaged 243% per year over a five 
year period, ten times higher than that of the company’s stock during the same 
period.  Id. at 347. 
228 See id. at 352–54. 
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In addition, the chancellor ruled that the allegations were 
more than just a challenge to the board’s duty of care.  They also 
posed charges of a per se violation of its duty of loyalty.  They 
constituted, the court said, “intentional violations of a 
shareholder approved stock option plan, coupled with fraudulent 
disclosures [in proxy statements] regarding the directors’ 
purported compliance with that plan.”229  As such, the chancellor 
found that conduct to be “disloyal to the corporation and . . . in 
bad faith.”230 
Chancellor Chandler decided the second Delaware case231 on 
the same day as Ryan.  Among other things, it involved charges 
that a board approved spring-loaded options, which the court 
called a “much more subtle deception” than options 
backdating.232  There, according to the pattern,233 several “well-
timed” options grants were made right before the announcement 
of highly favorable news that caused a jump in the company’s 
stock price.234  The options were duly issued in compliance “with 
the strict letter” of a stock incentive plan approved by 
shareholders requiring that the exercise price be no lower than 
the fair market value of the stock on the day the options were 
granted.235 
The chancellor found that this practice, “without explicit 
authorization from shareholders, clearly involves an indirect 
deception.”236  He elaborated, “A director who intentionally uses 
inside knowledge . . . in order to enrich employees . . . cannot . . . 
be said to be acting loyally and in good faith as a fiduciary.”237 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
There are valid reasons for the business judgment rule.  
Corporate officials run dynamic enterprises, and the market is a 
 
229 Id. at 358. 
230 Id. 
231 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
232 Id. at 592. 
233 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
234 Tyson Foods, 919 A.2d at 576. 
235 See id. at 592–93. 
236 Id. at 592. 
237 Id. at 593. 
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notoriously fickle place to make a profit.  So business people 
should not be unduly restricted in taking initiatives for fear that 
they will suffer personal losses if their projects do not prove 
successful. 
Shareholders and society at large, however, have a legitimate 
expectation that corporate officials will do their jobs, i.e., that 
they will be faithful to the responsibilities of their offices 
whether such conduct is called acting with due care, with loyalty, 
or in good faith.  In the ultimate reckoning, then, the business 
judgment rule cannot give a blank check to either full boards or 
to their hand-picked special litigation committees.  One great 
twentieth-century president knew well the potential for some 
business leaders to act unscrupulously when he called them 
“malefactors of great wealth.”238  That charge does not seem at 
all inappropriate today when applied to corporate executives 
who have backdated options and directors who have allowed 
such a corrupt practice to flourish. 
The derivative suit has proven its worth as a mechanism for 
holding corporate officials responsible for their actions, and it 
again bears the most promise to rectify such derelict behavior as 
options backdating.  As Holmes put it at the beginning of the 
twentieth century in his famous address The Path of the Law, “A 
man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and 
practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good 
deal to avoid being made to pay money . . . .”239 
Delaware and other jurisdictions must step back from the 
permissive attitude of the Disney case.  Early rulings finding 
directors liable in the option backdating scandal, such as Ryan 
and Tyson Foods, are showing the way.  There lies the true path 
of corporate law in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
238 MICHAEL E. MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT:  THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920, at 177 (2003) (quoting 
Theodore Roosevelt at the dedication of a memorial to the Pilgrims at 
Provincetown, Massachusetts, in August 1907). 
239 Holmes, supra note 2, at 459.  President Theodore Roosevelt appointed 
Justice Holmes to the U.S. Supreme Court. James M. Morton, Jr., Address at a 
Memorial Service for Oliver Wendell Holmes at a Special Session of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Oct. 9, 1937), in 298 MASS. 575, 594 (1937). 
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